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Rogers v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 25 (June 2, 2011)1 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
Summary 
Appeal from judgment of conviction, pursuant to jury verdict, of driving under the 
influence of a controlled substance on grounds certain evidence was inadmissible. 
Disposition/Outcome  
A unanimous three-judge panel affirmed because the statutory doctor-patient evidentiary 
privilege does not apply to paramedics or EMTs. 
Factual and Procedural History 
David M. Rogers (“Rogers”) was convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled 
substance (marijuana) causing substantial bodily harm and was sentenced to a prison term.  The 
jury heard evidence from a paramedic who took Rogers by ambulance to the hospital.  The 
paramedic testified that Rogers told him he had smoked marijuana before the accident.  Rogers 
argued on appeal that his statement to the paramedic was inadmissible because it was protected 
by Nevada’s doctor-patient privilege. Rogers alleged other grounds for appeal, but none were 
properly preserved. 
Discussion 
Doctor-Patient Privilege 
Nevada’s doctor-patient privilege is codified at NRS 49.215-.245.2  Each of the key 
terms in the statute—doctor, patient, and confidential—has a given definition.3  “‘Doctor’ me
a person licensed to practice medicine, dentistry or osteopathic medicine in any state or nation, 
or a person who is reasonably believed by the patient to be so licensed, and in addition includes
person employed . . . as a psychiatric social worker.”
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The Court rejected expanding the doctor-patient privilege to include EMTs or 
paramedics.  Although Rogers intended his statement to the paramedic to remain confidential, 
the Court found “doctor,” as defined in statute, does not include EMTs or paramedics. Because 
evidentiary privileges “are in derogation of the search for truth,”5 the Court has consistently held 
that statutory privileges should be construed narrowly, according to the “plain meaning of [their] 
 
1 By Sean W. McDonald. 
2 The general rule of the privilege states “A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications among the patient, the patient’s doctor or persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the doctor, including members of the patient’s 
family.”  NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.225 (2009). 
3  See id. § 49.215(1)-(3). 
4 Id. § 49.215(2). 
5 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1994), cited in Ashokan v. State Dep’t of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 856 P.2d 
244, 247 (1993). 
words.”6  Further, the Legislature has not included EMTs or paramedics in the statute’s 
definition of “doctor.”  Applying the narrow construction of statutory privileges, the doctor-
patient privilege statute does not apply to communications between an EMT or paramedic and 
patient when those communications do not occur in the presence, or at the direction, of a doctor, 
as defined in statute.7 
Rogers further argued that his statement to the paramedic is protected because the statute 
protects as privileged all communications “among the patient, the patient’s doctor or persons 
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the doctor.”  Because 
EMTs are regulated by the state and since the paramedic worked under the auspices of a medical 
director, Rogers concluded the paramedic was acting under the direction of a doctor—the 
medical director under whose auspices the paramedic worked—thereby qualifying for the 
privilege. 
The Court dismissed that argument as a misreading of the statute. The statute protects the 
relationship between “the” patient’s doctor, not the relationship between “a” doctor and another 
person. The medical director who supervised the paramedic was not Rogers’ doctor, and thus the 
privilege does not apply. The district court below found the paramedic was not operating under 
the direction of Rogers’ doctor. 
Conclusion 
Although a policy argument can be made that the doctor-patient privilege should apply to 
paramedics and EMTs, the Court could not ignore the substantial competing concern with 
availability of evidence. Because statutory evidentiary privileges are construed narrowly, and 
since Rogers could not meet the burden of establishing the privilege,8 the judgment of the district 
court was affirmed. 
                                                 
6 Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 670, 856 P.2d at 249; McNair v. Dist. Ct., 110 Nev. 1285, 1288, 885 P.2d 576, 578 (1994); 
Whitehead v. Comm’n on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 380, 414-15, 873 P.2d 946, 968 (1994); see State v. Fouquette, 
67 Nev. 505, 536-37, 221 P.2d 404, 420-21 (1950). 
7 Accord Med-Express, Inc. v. Tarpley, 629 So. 2d 331, 332 (La. 1993); State v. LaRoche, 442 A.2d 602, 603 (N.H. 
1982); State v. Ross, 947 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
8 McNair, 110 Nev. at 1289, 885 P.2d at 579. 
